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BOOK REVIEWS
Morals, Reasons, and Animals
Reviewed by Sudhir K. Chopra
Sapontzis, S.F., Morals, Reason, and Animals. Temple University Press, Phila-
delphia (1987); ISBN 0-87722-493, xix, 302 pp.
Morals, Reasons, and Animals, primarily a philosophical analysis of
animal rights, is recommended reading for environmental lawyers and es-
pecially those interested in the development of legal philosophy or juris-
prudential approach for the conservation of environment, nature, wildlife
species or ecosystems. One of the purposes of this review is to draw the
attention of those concerned with nature or wildlife protection problems
to a very rich literature outside the conventional legal writings which can
be very helpful in developing something more than a mere public policy
argument. Neither the legal systems nor the legal framework developed
out of the public policy. Almost every basic principle of common law or
even most of the public international law owes its origin to philosophical
writings from the ancient times. Whether it was the positivist approach
or the historical school or the Natural Law or the Sociological Jurispru-
dence or the pure theory of law or even the utilitarianism, they all pro-
vide philosophical analysis of various legal principles. Immanuel Kant
wrote on duties to animals and spirits.' John Rawls, in A Theory of Jus-
tice2 talks about the need not "to be cruel to animals," and says "destruc-
tion of the whole species can be a great evil." In contemporary writings
most notable is the discussion of these philosophical approaches in
Greenwalt's "Religious Convictions and Lawmaking."'3 These are all legal
theorists making best use of the philosophical writings in developing their
legal thoughts, however, most of the legal writings tend to ignore the exis-
tence of such literature only because they happen to come from disci-
plines other than laws.
International law has seen the adoption of many conservationist con-
ventions since the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,4 which do represent the
views of conservationists. At the same time national legislators are grow-
ing both in numbers and their effectiveness to protect animals and wild
species.5 Obviously this movement is not a legal movement; its roots lie in
animal rights and protectionist views, yet it is not difficult to notice a
1. I. KANT, DUTIES TO ANIMALS AND SPIRITS, reprinted in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS 122-23 (1976).
2. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 512 (1971).
3. Greenwalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 MicH. L. REV. 365-69 (1985);
Greenwalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religions Conviction: Protecting
Animals and Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (1986).
4. See generally Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environ-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).
5. See generally E. LEAVrIT, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 1970). This
book provides a survey of laws in the U.S. and many other countries concerned with animal
rights.
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general lack of concern for such valuable philosophical opinions in legal
works. Considering this situation, appearance of the work Morals, Rea-
son, and Animals is a very timely addition to animal rights and species
protection literature.
In this work Sapontzis attacks the common approach that we are
morally right in exploiting animals for our benefit only because they are
not as rational as people." Part I of the book in its four chapters argues
against the moral significance of reason. The first chapter discusses the
rationality, the second analyzes reason, the third deals with the relation
of rationality with moral agents, and the fourth chapter analyzes the con-
cept of "personhood" in both moral and metaphysical sense and moves on
to elaborate on the humanist approach. Part II deals with animal rights
in two chapters which are devoted to discussing animal liberation and the
reasons for liberating animals. In Part III the author develops a theory to
create animal interests using several theoretical examples and then dis-
cuses the requirements of moral community vis-a-vis the animal rights.
The next chapter discusses the significance of death in determining the
value of life. In this chapter the author discusses the difference between
having an interest in life and the right to life and concludes on the basis
of his analysis that a moral right to life to animals can be extended. The
last chapter of this part is devoted to evaluating the moral standing based
on replacement theory which owes its origin to utilitarianism, finally con-
cluding, based on his analysis, that these theories do extend moral value
to animal life. The last part in four chapters deals with vegetarianism,
animal research and plants. The last chapter is devoted to the discussion
of environmental ethics.
This is the first extensive second generation study of animal rights,
and answers the criticism of the animal rights movement without falling
into pitfalls of earlier animal rights literature. This is a complete rebuttal
of arguments raised against animal rights. All through the book the au-
thor has used clear and precise examples to explain, develop, clarify and
rebut various positions. In the last part Professor Sapontzis very skillfully
blends the values of environmental ethics with animal liberation. The
book has a very useful index but the bibliography is limited. The publish-
ers have done a very good job in preparation of this work. It does not
suffer from some of the major editorial flaws visible in commercial
publications.
6. KANT, supra note 1, at 122-23; Greenwalt, supra note 3, at 1024.
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